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by Mark H. Kawa, vice president, Supervision and Regulation, and Steven VanBever, lead supervision analyst, Supervision  
and Regulation
The sixth annual Community Bankers Symposium, co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), was held at the 
Chicago Fed on November 19, 2010. This article summarizes the key presentations and 
discussions at the conference.
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major­concern­at­many­smaller­banks.­Although banking conditions are beginning to improve,  

























































































































































of­Financial­Institutions.­Community banks see both victories and disappointments in 
the new financial reform law.
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Overall,­banking­conditions­in­the­four­
states­have­improved­but­are­still­far­from­
satisfactory.­However,­the­economic­and­
banking­picture­varies­significantly­from­
state­to­state.­For­example,­Iowa­experi-
enced­slower­growth­in­the­run-up­to­the­
financial­and­economic­crisis,­as­well­as­
a­less­severe­downturn.­At­6.8%,­Iowa’s­
unemployment­rate­is­relatively­low.­
Michigan,­in­contrast,­has­an­unemploy-
ment­rate­of­12.8%­and­has­been­under-
going­a­historic,­long-term­realignment­
of­its­automotive-dependent­economy.­
Illinois­has­experienced­by­far­the­largest­
number­of­bank­failures­in­the­District—­
38­between­October­2008­and­November­
2010.10­For­all­the­states,­the­recovery­pro-
cess­for­both­the­banks­and­the­underlying­
economies­is­expected­to­be­protracted.­
In­response­to­questions­from­the­audi-
ence,­the­panelists­maintained­that­re-
cent­downgrades­in­banks’­supervisory­
ratings­reflected­deteriorating­banking­
conditions­and­not­a­new,­harsher­atti-
tude­on­the­part­of­regulators.­Regulators­
have­been­criticized­both­for­being­too­
lenient­(by­their­internal­inspector-general­
functions)­and­for­being­too­severe­(by­
the­industry­and­by­Congress).­However,­
the­panelists­argued­that­examiners’­
assessments­are­still­driven­by­objective­
data­and­also­contended­that­multiple­
layers­of­review­help­promote­consistency.
Regarding­the­effects­of­the­Dodd–Frank­
Act­on­competition­to­community­banks­
from­nonbanks,­panelists­noted­that­this­
act­levels­the­playing­field­by­subjecting­
nonbanks­to­bank-like­consumer­super-
vision.­However,­much­depends­on­how­
well­the­CFPB­executes­its­responsibili-
ties­and­is­able­to­collaborate­with­its­
state­counterparts.
Industry perspectives
The­Independent­Community­Bankers­
of­America­(ICBA)­is­a­trade­associa-
tion­representing­community­banks.­
Karen­M.­Thomas,­its­senior­executive­
vice­president,­outlined­the­ICBA’s­
strategy­regarding­the­Dodd–Frank­Act­
and­assessment­of­the­positives­and­
negatives­in­the­new­law.
Thomas­called­the­Dodd–Frank­Act­
“massive,­landscape-changing,­genera-
tional­legislation.”­She­emphasized­that­
for­the­industry,­implementation­would­
be­“a­marathon,­not­a­sprint,”­because­
many­key­elements­still­need­to­be­deter-
mined­through­the­rule-making­process­
and­the­industry­will­need­to­continue­to­
exert­its­influence.­ICBA­recognized­that­
financial­reform­legislation­was­inevita-
ble,­Thomas­said,­and­sought­to­obtain­
a­“seat­at­the­table.”­It­then­attempted­
to­keep­the­focus­on­the­role­that­the­
largest­banks­and­nonbank­companies­
had­played­in­causing­the­financial­crisis­
while­differentiating­and­protecting­the­
interests­of­community­banks.
According­to­Thomas,­community­banks­
achieved­a­number­of­victories­in­the­new­
law.­For­example,­FDIC­deposit-insurance­
assessments­will­now­be­calculated­on­a­
different­basis,­which­will­significantly­
reduce­assessments­for­community­banks.­
The­coverage­limit­for­deposit­insurance­
was­permanently­increased­to­$250,000,­
and­unlimited­coverage­for­non-interest-
bearing­transaction­accounts­under­the­
FDIC’s­Transaction­Account­Guarantee­
was­extended­for­two­years.­In­addition,­
policies­intended­to­reduce­systemic­risk­
and­address­the­too-big-to-fail­problem11­
should­reduce­risks­to­the­financial­sys-
tem­and­provide­for­a­more­competitive­
marketplace­for­community­banks.
Banks­with­less­than­$10­billion­in­assets­
are­also­generally­exempt­from­exami-
nations­and­enforcement­actions­by­the­
CFPB.­Community­banks­will­continue­
to­be­examined­by­their­existing­bank­
regulators,­who,­Thomas­argued,­have­
a­better­understanding­of­the­interplay­
between­safety-and-soundness­and­con-
sumer­protection­than­the­CFPB­may­
have.­Finally,­banking­organizations­with­
less­than­$15­billion­in­assets­obtained­
some­relief­from­the­Dodd–Frank­Act’s­
restrictions­on­trust­preferred­securities.12
Thomas­also­detailed­some­of­the­dis-
appointing­provisions­of­the­Dodd–Frank­
Act.­Although­banks­with­less­than­­
$10­billion­in­assets­will­be­exempt­from­
the­new­interchange­rules,­she­expected­
that­the­rules­would­still­significantly­re-
duce­debit­interchange­income­at­com-
munity­banks.­Many­community­bank­
representatives­also­object­to­the­creation­
of­a­stand-alone­CFPB,­the­exemption­
of­auto­dealers­from­regulation­by­the­
CFPB,­the­requirement­that­shareholders­
of­publicly­traded­community­banks­must­
be­given­a­nonbinding­vote­on­executive­
compensation,­and­new­reporting­re-
quirements­for­loans­to­small­businesses­
and­minority-owned­businesses.­
Thomas­noted­that­whether­the­too-
big-to-fail­problem­is­actually­eliminated­
and­how­community­banks­are­actually­
affected­by­the­CFPB,­among­other­as-
pects­of­the­implementation­of­the­
Dodd–Frank­Act,­will­not­be­clear­for­
some­time.­She­concluded­by­listing­a­
wide­range­of­other­challenges­commu-
nity­banks­now­face.­These­include­stra-
tegic­issues,­CRE­lending,­the­economic­
and­interest­rate­environment,­and­the­
need­to­strengthen­capital­levels­and­
risk­management­in­the­context­of­the­
current­supervisory­environment.­In­1­Community­banks­are­typically­smaller­banks,­
which­conduct­most­of­their­business­in­
their­local­communities.­The­size­thresh-
old­most­often­used­is­$1­billion­in­assets.
2­The­Chicago­Fed­serves­the­Seventh­Federal­
Reserve­District,­which­comprises­all­of­Iowa­
and­most­of­Illinois,­Indiana,­Michigan,­
and­Wisconsin.
3­For­more­details,­see­www.fanniemae.com­
and­www.freddiemac.com.
4­CRE­lending­refers­to­loans­secured­by­com-
mercial­real­estate­(e.g.,­office­buildings­
and­shopping­centers),­whose­repayment­
typically­comes­from­rental­income­or­
sale/refinancing­of­the­property.
5­See­www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20091030a.htm.­This­policy­
was­issued­by­the­Federal­Reserve,­the­FDIC,­
the­National­Credit­Union­Administration,­
the­Office­of­the­Comptroller­of­the­­
Currency,­the­Office­of­Thrift­Supervision,­
and­the­Federal­Financial­Institutions­­
Examination­Council­State­Liaison­
Committee.
6­A­loan­concentration­exists­when­a­signifi-
cant­portion­of­a­bank’s­loans­have­similar­
risk­characteristics.­For­example,­a­concen-
tration­may­exist­for­loans­of­a­particular­
type­(mortgages),­to­a­particular­industry,­
or­from­a­particular­geographical­area.
7­See­www.csbs.org/news/press-releases/
pr2010/Pages/pr102010a.aspx.
8­See­www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.htm.
9­An­interchange­fee­is­a­fee­that­a­merchant’s­
bank­pays­a­customer’s­bank­when­a­mer-
chant­accepts­cards­using­card­networks,­
such­as­Visa­and­MasterCard,­for­a­purchase.
10­ In­contrast,­there­were­nine­failures­in­
Michigan,­three­in­Wisconsin,­and­only­
one­each­in­Indiana­and­Iowa­during­the­
same­time­period.­
11­ Regulatory­authorities­have­strong­incen-
tives­to­prevent­the­failure­of­a­large,­highly­
interconnected­financial­firm­because­of­
the­risks­such­a­failure­would­pose­to­the­
financial­system­and­the­broader­economy.­
However,­the­belief­of­market­participants­
that­a­particular­firm­is­considered­too­big­
to­fail­has­a­number­of­undesirable­effects,­
including­reducing­market­discipline,­en-
couraging­excessive­risk-taking,­and­increas-
ing­costs­to­taxpayers.
12­ Trust­preferred­securities­are­cumulative­
preferred­securities,­issued­through­a­special-
purpose­vehicle,­that­combine­the­benefits­
of­debt­and­equity.­These­have­become­an­
important­source­of­capital­for­community­
banking­organizations.
spite­of­these­challenges,­she­praised­
community­banks­for­their­extraordi-
nary­resilience­and­predicted­that­well-
managed­banks­would­always­find­ways­
to­overcome­such­challenges.
Conclusion
Lemieux­also­emphasized­the­continuing­
viability­of­the­community­bank­model.­
Community­banks­are­grounded­in­their­
local­communities­and­thus­are­able­to­
provide­services­that­are­personalized­
and­tailored­to­meet­local­preferences­
and­needs.­By­transforming­local­deposits­
into­lending­in­the­areas­where­deposi-
tors­live­and­work,­community­banks­
contribute­to­local­economic­growth­
and­vitality.­
Community­banks­embody­the­notion­of­
relationship­banking.­They­are­less­de-
pendent­than­larger­banks­on­financial­
models­and­thus­are­able­to­take­account­
of­a­wider­range­of­factors­when­making­
loan­decisions.­In­addition,­they­often­
can­respond­to­lending­requests­faster­
than­larger­banks­because­they­have­a­
more­direct­window­into­customers’­­
financing­needs­and­capacities.
Closing­the­symposium,­M.­Anthony­
Lowe,­regional­director,­FDIC,­noted­the­
contentious­process­that­had­led­to­the­
passage­of­the­Dodd–Frank­Act­but­also­
emphasized­the­clear­benefits­the­law­
provided­for­community­banks.­These­
include­the­deposit­insurance­changes­
noted­earlier,­as­well­as­attempts­to­end­
the­too-big-to-fail­problem­and­strengthen­
regulation­of­nonbank­competitors.­
The­combined­effect­of­these­changes­
should­be­to­level­the­playing­field­for­
community­banks.­
Lowe­predicted­that­CRE­loan­concen-
trations­would­take­additional­time­to­
resolve.­On­the­positive­side,­he­noted­
that­the­pace­of­bank­failures­was­slow-
ing­and­that­the­number­of­failures­for­
2010­as­a­whole­would­be­much­lower­
than­some­had­predicted.­Some­banks­
are­seeing­their­earnings­recover­and­
new­capital­become­available.­Finally,­
Lowe­stressed­that­regulators­are­com-
mitted­to­working­with­community­
banks­to­help­them­thrive­and­contin-
ue­to­support­their­local­economies.